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Abstract—Transaction-level modeling with SystemC has been
very successful in describing the behavior of embedded systems
by providing high-level executable models, in which many of
them have an inherent probabilistic behavior, i.e., random data,
unreliable components. It is crucial to evaluate the quantitative
and qualitative analysis of the probability of the system prop-
erties. Such analysis can be conducted by constructing a formal
model of the system and using probabilistic model checking.
However, this method is infeasible for large and complex systems
due to the state space explosion. In this paper, we demonstrate
the successful use of statistical model checking to carry out such
analysis directly from large SystemC models and allows designers
to express a wide range of useful properties.
Keywords-Runtime Verification, Probabilistic Assertion, Statis-
tical Model Checking, Program Verification, SystemC
I. INTRODUCTION
Transaction-level modeling (TLM) with SystemC has been
become increasingly prominent in describing the behavior of
embedded systems [3], i.e., System-on-Chips (SoCs). It allows
complex electronic components and software control units
to be combined into a single model, enabling simulation of
the whole system at once. In many cases, models include
probabilistic characteristics, i.e, random data, reliability of the
system’s components. It is crucial to evaluate the quantitive
and qualitative analysis of the probability of the system’s
properties. For instance, the reliability and availability of an
embedded control system [14] that contains an input processor
connected to groups of sensors, an output processor, connected
to groups of actuators, and a main processor, that communi-
cates with the I/O processors through a bus, can be modeled
by a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) [25]. CTMC is
a special case of a discrete-state stochastic process in which
the probability distribution of the next state depends only on
the current state. The analysis quantifies the probability or rate
of all safety-related faults: How likely the system is available
to meet a demand for service? What is the probability that
the system repairs itself after a failure (e.g., that the system
conforms to the existent and prominent standards such as the
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs))?
In order to conduct such analysis, a general approach is
modeling and analyzing a probabilistic model of the system
(i.e, Markov chains, stochastic processes), in which the algo-
rithm for computing the measures of properties depends on the
class of systems being considered and the logic used for spec-
ifying the properties. Many algorithms with the corresponding
mature tools are based on model checking techniques that
compute probability by a numerical approach [4], [21], [9]. For
a variety of probabilistic systems, the most popular modeling
formalism is Markov chain or Markov decision processes,
for which Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) tools such as
PRISM [10] and MRMC [13] can be used. PMC is widely used
and has been successfully applied to the verification of a range
of timed and probabilistic systems. One of the main challenges
is the complexity of the algorithms in terms of execution time
and memory space due to the size of the state space that tends
to grow exponentially, also known as the state space explosion.
As a result, the analysis is infeasible. In addition, these tools
cannot work directly with the SystemC source code, meaning
that a formal model of SystemC model needs to be provided.
An alternative way to evaluate these systems is Statisti-
cal Model Checking (SMC), a simulation-based approach.
Simulation-based approaches produce an approximation of
the value to be evaluated, based on a finite set of system’s
executions. Clearly, comparing to the numerical approach, a
simulation-based solution does not provide an exact answer.
However, users can tune the statistical parameters such as
the confidence interval and the confidence, according to the
requirements. Simulation-based approaches do not construct
all the reachable states of the model-under-verification (MUV),
thus they require far less execution time and memory space
than numerical approaches. For some real-life systems, they
are the only one option [28] and have shown the advantages
over other methods such as PMC [9], [12].
Our overall framework weaves the idea of statistical model
checking to yield qualitative and quantitative analysis for prob-
ability of a temporal property for SystemC models. The paper
makes the following contributions: (i) we propose a framework
to verify bounded temporal properties for SystemC models
with both timed and probabilistic characteristics. The frame-
work contains two main components: a monitor that observes
a set of execution traces of the MUV and a statistical model
checker implementing a set of hypothesis testing algorithms.
We use techniques similar to the one proposed by Tabakov et
al. [23] to automatically generate the monitor. The statistical
model checker is implemented as a plugin of the checker
Plasma Lab [2], in which the properties to be verified are
expressed in Bounded Linear Temporal Logic (BLTL); (ii) we
present a method that allows users to expose a rich set of user-
code primitives in form of atomic propositions in BLTL. These
propositions help users exposing the state of the SystemC
simulation kernel and the full state of the SystemC source code
model. In addition, users can define their own fine-grained
time resolution that is used to reason on the semantics of the
logic expressing the properties rather the boundary of clock
cycles in the SystemC simulation; and (iii) we demonstrate our
approach through a running example, in which we showcase
how our SMC-based verification framework works. We also
illustrate the performance of the framework through some
experiments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SystemC and the Simulation Kernel
SystemC1 is a C++ library [6] providing primitives for
modeling hardware and software systems at the level of
transactions. Every SystemC model can be compiled with
a standard C++ compiler to produce an executable program
called executable specification. This specification is used to
simulate the system behavior with the provided event-driven
simulator. A SystemC model is a hierarchical composition
of modules (sc module). Modules are building blocks of
SystemC design, they are like modules in Verilog [24], classes
in C++. A module consists of an interface for communicating
with other modules and a set of processes running concurrently
to describe the functionality of the module. An interface
contains ports (sc port), they are similar to the hardware pins.
Modules are interconnected using either primitive channels
(i.e., the signals, sc signal) or hierarchical channels via their
ports. Channels are data containers that generate events in the
simulation kernel whenever the contained data changes.
Processes are not hierarchical, so no process can call another
process directly. A process is either a thread or a method. A
thread process (sc thread) can suspend its execution by calling
the library statement wait or any of its variants. When the
execution is resumed, it will continue from that point. Threads
run only once during the execution of the program and are not
expected to terminate. On the other hand, a method process
(sc method) cannot suspend its execution by calling wait and
is expected to terminate. Thus, it only returns the control to
the kernel when reaching the end of its body.
An event is an instance of the SystemC event class
(sc event) whose occurrence triggers or resumes the execution
of a process. All processes which are suspended by waiting for
an event are resumed when this event occurs, we say that the
event is notified. A module’s process can be sensitive to a list
of events. For example, a process may suspend itself and wait
for a value change of a specific signal. Then, only this event
occurrence can resume the execution of the process. In general,
a process can wait for an event, a combination of events, or for
an amount of time to be resumed. In SystemC, integer values
are used as discrete time model. The smallest quantum of
time that can be represented is called time resolution meaning
that any time value smaller than the time resolution will be
rounded off. The available time resolutions are femtosecond,
picosecond, nanosecond, microsecond, millisecond, and sec-
ond. SystemC provides functions to set time resolution and de-
clare a time object. The SystemC simulator is an event-driven
simulation [1], [19]. It establishes a hierarchical network of
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finite number of parallel communicating processes which run
under the supervision of the distinguished simulation kernel
process. Only one process is dispatched by the scheduler to run
at a time point, and the scheduler is non-preemptive, that is,
the running process returns control to the kernel only when it
finishes executing or explicitly suspends itself by calling wait.
Like hardware modeling languages, the SystemC scheduler
supports the notion of delta-cycles [16]. A delta-cycle lasts for
an infinitesimal amount of time and is used to impose a partial
order of simultaneous actions which interprets zero-delay
semantics. Thus, the simulation time is not advanced when
the scheduler processes a delta-cycle. During a delta-cycle,
the scheduler executes actions in two phases: the evaluate and
the update phases.
The simulation semantics of the SystemC scheduler is
presented as follows: (1) Initialize. During the initialization,
each process is executed once unless it is turned off by calling
dont initialize(), or until a synchronization point (i.e., a wait)
is reached. The order in which these processes are executed is
unspecified; (2) Evaluate. The kernel starts a delta-cycle and
runs all processes that are ready to run one at a time. In this
same phase a process can be made ready to run by an event
notification; (3) Update. Execute any pending calls to update()
resulting from calls to request update() in the evaluate phase.
Note that a primitive channel uses request update() to have
the kernel call its update() function after the execution of
processes; (4) Delta-cycle notification. The kernel enters the
delta notification phase where notified events trigger their
dependent processes. Note that immediate notifications may
make new processes runnable during step (2). If so the kernel
loops back to step (2) and starts another evaluation phase and
a new delta-cycle. It does not advance simulation time; (5)
Simulation-cycle notification. If there are no more runnable
processes, the kernel advances simulation time to the earliest
pending timed notification. All processes sensitive to this event
are triggered, the kernel loops back to step (2) and starts a new
delta-cycle. This process is finished when all processes have
terminated or the specified simulation time is passed.
B. Statistical Model Checking
We first recall the syntax and semantics of BLTL [22], an
extension of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) with time bounds
on temporal operators. A formula ϕ is defined over a set of
atomic propositions AP as in LTL by the grammar ϕ ::=
true|false|p ∈ AP |ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2|¬ϕ|ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2, where the time
bound T is an amount of time or a number of states in the
execution trace. The temporal modalities F (the “eventually”,
sometimes in the future) and G (the “always”, from now on
forever) can be derived from the “until” U as follows.
F≤T ϕ = true U≤T ϕ and G≤T ϕ = ¬F≤T ¬ϕ
The semantics of BLTL is defined w.r.t execution traces of
a model. Let ω = (s0, t0)(s1, t1)...(sN−1, tN−1), N ∈ N be
an execution trace, ωk and ωk be the prefix and suffix of
ω respectively. We denote the fact that ω satisfies the BLTL
formula ϕ by ω |= ϕ.
• ωk |= true and ωk 6|= false
• ωk |= p, p ∈ AP iff p ∈ L(sk), where L(sk) is the set
of atomic propositions which are true in state sk
• ωk |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff ωk |= ϕ1 and ωk |= ϕ2
• ωk |= ¬ϕ iff ωk 6|= ϕ
• ωk |= ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2 iff there exists i ∈ N such that ωk+i |=
ϕ2, Σ0<j≤i(tk+j − tk+j−1) ≤ T , and for each 0 ≤ j <
i, ωk+j |= ϕ1
Let M be the formal model of the MUV (i.e., a stochastic
process) and ϕ be a property expressed as a BLTL for-
mula. The statistical model checking [15] problem consists
of answering the following questions: (i) Is the probability
that M satisfies ϕ greater or equal to a threshold θ with a
specific level of statistical confidence (qualitative analysis,
written M |= Pr≥θ(ϕ))? (ii) What is the probability that
M satisfies ϕ with a specific level of statistical confidence
(quantitative analysis, writtenM |= Pr(ϕ))? Many statistical
model checker are implemented [27], [2] that have shown their
advantages over other methods such as PMC on several case
studies.
This is done by associating each execution trace of M
with a discrete random Bernoulli variable Bi, in which the
outcome for Bi, denoted by bi, is 1 if the trace satisfies
ϕ and 0 otherwise. The predominant statistical method for
verifying M |= Pr≥θ(ϕ) is based on hypothesis testing.
Let p = Pr(ϕ), to determine whether p ≥ θ, we test the
hypothesis H0 : p ≥ p0 = θ + δ against the alternative
hypothesis H1 : p ≤ p1 = θ − δ based on the observations
of Bi. The size of indifference region is defined by p0 − p1.
If we take acceptance of H0 to mean acceptance of Pr≥θ(ϕ)
as true and acceptance of H1 to mean rejection of Pr≥θ(ϕ)
as false, then we can use acceptance sampling (e.g., Younes
in [26] has proposed two solutions, called single sampling plan
and sequential probability ratio test) to verify Pr≥θ(ϕ). An
acceptance sampling test with strength (α, β) guarantees that
H1 is accepted with probability at most α when H0 holds and
H0 is accepted with probability at most β when H1 holds,
called a Type-I error and Type-II error, respectively.
To answer the quantitative question, M |= Pr(ϕ), an
alternative statistical method, based on estimation instead of
hypothesis testing, has been developed. For instance, the prob-
ability estimations are based on results derived by Chernoff
and Hoeffding bounds [11]. This approach uses n observations
b1, ..., bn to compute an approximation of p: p˜ = 1nΣ
n
i=1bi.
The approximation satisifies that Pr[|p˜ − p| < δ] ≥ 1 − α.
Based on the theorem of Hoeffding, the number of observa-
tions which is determined from the absolute error δ and the
confidence 1− α is n = d 12δ2 log 2αe.
Although SMC can only provide approximate results with a
user-specified level of statistical confidence, it is compensated
for by its better scalability and resource consumption. Since
the models to be analyzed are often approximately known,
an approximate result in the analysis of desired properties
within specific bounds is quite acceptable. SMC has recently
been applied in a wide range of research areas including
software engineering (e.g., verification of critical embedded
systems) [9], system biology, or medical area [12].
III. A RUNNING EXAMPLE
We will use a simple case study with a FIFO channel as
a running example. This example illustrates how designers
can create hierarchical channels that encapsulate both design
structure and communication protocols. In the design, once
a nanosecond the producer will write one character to the
FIFO with probability p1, while the consumer will read one
character from the FIFO with probability p2. The FIFO which
is derived from sc channel encapsulates the communication
protocol between the producer and the consumer.
The FIFO channel is designed to ensure that all data is
reliably delivered despite the varying rates of production and
consumption. The channel uses an event notification hanshake
protocol for both the input and output. It uses a circular buffer
implemented within a static array to store and retrieve the
items within the FIFO. We assume that the sizes of the mes-
sages and the FIFO buffer are fixed. Hence, it is obvious that
the time required to transfer completely a message, or message
latency, depends on the production and consumption rates, the
FIFO buffer size, the message size, and the probabilities of
successful writing and reading. The full implementation of the
example can be obtained at the url2, in which the probabilities
of writing and reading are implemented with the Bernoulli
distributions with probabilities p1 and p2 respectively from
GNU Scientific Library (GSL) [7].
The quantitative analysis under consideration is: “What is
the probability that messages are transfered completely within
T1 nanoseconds during T nanoseconds of operation?”. This
kind of analysis can, thus, be conducted in the early design
steps. To formulate the underlying property more precisely,
we have to take into account the agreement protocol between
the producer and consumer, i.e., the simple protocol can be
every message has special starting delimiter with the character
’&’ and ending delimiter with the character ’@’. Thus, the
property can be translated in BLTL as follows:
ϕ = G≤T ((c read = ′&′)→ F≤T1(c read = ′@′))
where c read is the character read in the FIFO by the
consumer. The input providing to the SMC checker is Pr(ϕ).
This property is expressed in terms of the characters read in
the FIFO by the consumer, but the communication protocol
between the producer and the consumer is abstracted at a very
high level. It is an illustration of the types of properties that
can be checked on TLM specifications. The verification of
such a property at the transaction level can be connected to its
counterpart at register-transfer level (RTL) in order to check
the correctness of RTL implementations.
IV. SMC FOR SYSTEMC MODELS
A. SystemC Model State
Temporal logic formulas are interpreted over execution
traces and traditionally a trace has been defined as a sequence
2https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/files/2015/09/producer consumer.tar .gz
of states in the execution of a model. Therefore before we can
define an execution trace we need a precise definition of the
state of a SystemC model simulation. We are inspired by the
definition of system state in [23], which consists of the state
of the simulation kernel and the state of the SystemC model.
We consider the external libraries as black boxes, meaning that
their states are not exposed.
The state of the kernel contains the information about the
current phase of the simulation (i.e., delta-cycle notification,
simulation-cycle simulation) and the SystemC events notified
during the execution of the model. The state of the SystemC
model is the full state of the C++ code of all modules in the
model, which includes the values of the module attributes, the
location of the program counter (i.e., a particular statement
is reached during the execution of the model, the function
calls), the call stack including the function execution, function
parameters and return values, and the status of the module pro-
cesses (i.e., suspended, runnable). We use V = {v0, ..., vn−1}
to denote the finite set of variables of primitive type (e.g, usual
scalar or enumerated type in C/C++) whose value domain DX
represents the states of a SystemC model.
We consider here some examples about states of the simu-
lation kernel and the SystemC model. Assume that a SystemC
model has an event named e, then the model state can contain
information such as the kernel is at the end of simulation-cycle
notification phase and the event e is notified. Consider the
running example again, a state can consist of the information
about the characters received by the consumer, represented by
the variable c read. It also contains the information about
the location of the program counter right before and after
a call of the function send() in the module Producer that
are represented by two Boolean variables send start and
send done, respectively, meaning that they hold the value true
immediately before and after a call of the function send().
Another example, we consider a module that consists several
statements at different locations in the source code, in which
these statements contain the division operator “/” followed by
zero or more spaces and the variable “a” (e.g., the statement y
= (x + 1) / a). Then, a Boolean variable which holds the value
true right before the execution of all such statements can be
used as a part of the states.
We have discussed so far the state of a SystemC model
execution. It remains to discuss how the semantics of the
temporal operators is interpreted over the states in an execu-
tion. That means how the states are sampled in order to make
the transition from one state to another state. The following
definition gives the concept of temporal resolution, in which
the states are evaluated only at instances in which the temporal
resolution holds. It allows the user to set granularity of time.
Definition 1 (Temporal resolution): A temporal resolution
Tr is a finite set of Boolean expressions defined over V which
specifies when the set of variables V is evaluated.
Temporal resolution can be used to define a more fine-grained
model of time than a coarse-grained one provided by a cycle-
based simulation. We call the expressions in Tr temporal
events. Whenever a temporal event is satisfied or the temporal
event occurs, V is sampled. For example, in the producer and
consumer model, assume that we want the satisfaction of the
underlying BLTL ϕ to be checked whenever at the end of
simulation-cycle notification or immediately after the event
write event is notified during a run of the model. Hence, we
can define a temporal resolution as the following set Tr =
{end sc, we notified}, where end sc and we notified are
Boolean expressions that have the value true whenever the
kernel phase is at the end of the simulation-cycle notification
and the event write event notified, respectively.
We denote the set of occurrences of temporal events from
Tr along an execution of a SystemC model by T sr , called a
temporal resolution set. The value of a variable v ∈ V at an
event occurrence ec ∈ T sr is defined by a mapping ξvval : T sr →
Dv , where Dv is the value domain of v. Hence, the state of the
SystemC model at ec is defined by a tuple (ξv0val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ).
A mapping ξt : T sr → T is called a time event that identifies
the simulation time at each occurrence of an event from the
temporal resolution. Hence, the set of time points, called time
tag, which corresponds to a temporal resolution set T sr =
{ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N, is given as follows.
Definition 2 (Time tag): Given a temporal resolution set
T sr , the time tag T corresponding to T sr is a finite or infinite
set of non-negative reals {t0, t1, ..., tN−1}, where ti+1 − ti =
δti ∈ R≥0, ti = ξt(eci).
B. Model and Execution Trace
A SystemC model can be viewed as a hierarchical network
of parallel communicating processes. Hence, the execution of
a SystemC model is an alternation of the control between the
model’s processes, the external libraries and the kernel process.
The execution of the processes is supervised by the kernel
process to concurrently update new values for the signals and
variables w.r.t the cycle-based simulation. For example, given
a set of runnable processes in a simulation-cycle, the kernel
chooses one of them to execute first in a non-deterministic
manner as described in the prior section.
Let V be the set of variables whose values represent
the states of a SystemC model. The values of variables
in V are determined by a given probability distribution
(i.e., production from all probability distributions used in
the model). Given a temporal resolution Tr and its cor-
responding temporal resolution set along an execution of
the model T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N, the evaluation
of V at the event occurrence eci is defined by the tuple
(ξv0val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ), or a state of the model at eci , denoted by
V (eci) = (V (eci)(v0), V (eci)(v1), ..., V (eci)(vn−1)), where
V (eci)(vk) = ξ
vk
val(eci) with k = 0, ..., n − 1 is the value
of the variable vk at eci . We denote the set of all possible
evaluations by VT sr ⊆ DV , called the state space of the
random variables in V . State changes are observed only at
the moments of event occurrences. Hence, the operational
semantics of a SystemC model is represented by a stochastic
process {(V (eci), ξt(eci)), eci ∈ T sr }i∈N, taking values in
VT sr ×R≥0 and indexed by the parameter eci , which are event
occurrences in the temporal resolution set T sr . An execution
trace is a realization of the stochastic process is given as
follows.
Definition 3 (Execution trace): An execution trace of a
SystemC model corresponding to a temporal resolution
set T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N is a sequence of
states and event occurrence times, denoted by ω =
(s0, t0)...(sN−1, tN−1), such that for each i ∈ 0, ..., N − 1,
si = V (eci) and ti = ξt(eci).
N is the length (finite or infinite) of the execution, also denoted
by |ω|. Let V ′ ⊆ V , the projection of ω on V ′, denoted by
ω ↓V ′ , is an execution trace such that |ω ↓V ′ | = |ω| and
∀v ∈ V ′, ∀ec ∈ T sr , V ′(ec)(v) = V (ec)(v).
C. Expressing Properties
Our approach allows users to refer to a rich set of atomic
propositions AP which is defined over the set of variables V
as previously mentioned. These propositions abstract the states
of a SystemC model and evaluate to either true or false in such
a state. The implementation provides a mechanism that allows
users to declare V in order to define the set of propositions
AP without requiring users to write the monitoring code or
to write aspect-oriented programming advices manually.
Users declare these variables via a high-level language in
a configuration file as the input of our tool. For instance,
referring to the producer and consumer model, the declara-
tion location send start “%Producer::send()”:call declares a
Boolean variable send start that holds the value true imme-
diately before the execution of the model reaches a call site
of the function send() in the module Producer. The characters
received by the consumer which is represented by the variable
c read can be declared as attribute pnt con→c int c read,
where pnt con is a pointer to the Consumer object and c int
is an attribute of the Consumer module representing the
received character. The detailed syntax can be found in the
tool manual3.
AP are predicates defined over the set of variables V . Using
these predicates, users can define temporal properties related
to the states of the kernel and the SystemC model. Recall the
considered property of the running example, the predicates
which are defined over the variable c read are c read =′ &′
and c read =′ @′. Another example, assume that we want to
answer the following question: “Over a period of T time units,
is the probability that the number of elements in the FIFO
buffer in between n1 and n2 is greater or equal to θ with the
confidence α?”. The predicates need to be defined in order to
construct the underlying BLTL formula are n1 ≤ nelements
and nelements ≤ n2, where nelements is an integer variable
that represents the current number of elements in the FIFO
buffer (it captures the value of the num elements attribute in
the Fifo module). Then, the property can be translated in BLTL
with the operator “always” as follows. The input which is
given to the checker is Pr≥θ(ϕ) along with the confidence α.
ϕ = G≤T ((n1 ≤ nelements) & (nelements ≤ n2))
3https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/documentation/tutorial/mag manual/
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. MAG and SystemC Plugin
Fig. 1 shows our SMC-based verification tool implementa-
tion that contains two main components: a monitor and aspect-
advice generator (MAG) and a statistical model checker
(SystemC Plugin). In principle, the full state can be observed
during the simulation of the model. In practice, however, users
define a set of variables of interest, according to the properties
that the users want to verify, called observed variables, and
only these variables appear in the states of an execution
trace. Given a SystemC model, we use Vobs ⊆ V to denote
Fig. 1: The framework’s flow
the set of observed variables, to expose the states of the
SystemC model. Then, the observed execution traces of the
model are the projections of the execution traces on Vobs,
meaning that for every execution trace ω, the corresponding
observed execution trace is ω ↓Vobs . In the following, when
we mention execution traces, we mean observed execution
traces. The implementation of MAG allows users to define
a set of observed variables that is used with a temporal
resolution to generate a monitor. The implementation based
on the techniques in [23], in which a monitor and a file
containing aspects are generated in order to automatically
instrument the SystemC model with the help of AspectC++ [5]
and establish a communication between the generated monitor
and the instrumented model. The monitor evaluates the set
of observed variables at every time point at which an event
of the temporal resolution occurs during the SystemC model
simulation to produce a new state. For example, the variable
c read which observes the character received by the consumer
(the private attribute c int in the module Consumer) at the end
of simulation-cycle notification, is implemented by generating
a monitor and instrumenting the module Consumer to establish
a communication between them as follows. The module Con-
sumer is instrumented with AspectC++, in this case, such that
the monitor is its friend class, so the monitor can access the
private attributes of Consumer. The monitor defines a callback
function being called immediately at the end of simulation-
cycle notification, and a pointer pointing to an instance of
Consumer. The execution of the callback function consists
of getting the current value of the received character by the
consumer, assigning this character to c read, and executing
the monitor for one step (i.e., creating a new state and reporting
it to the Plasma plugin). If temporal resolutions involving
kernel simulation phases or event notifications are defined,
the calling mechanism of the callback function is realized
by modifiying the kernel (i.e., at the end of simulation-cycle
segment code, a call to the callback function is added).
The statistical model checker is implemented as a plugin
of Plasma Lab [2] that establishes a communication, in which
the generated monitor transmits execution traces of the MUV.
In the current version, the communication is done via the
standard input and output. When a new state is requested,
the monitor reports the current state (the values of variables
in Vobs) to the plugin. The length of traces depends on the
satisfaction of the formula to be verified, which is finite
because the temporal operators are bounded. Similarly, the
required number of execution traces depends on the hypothesis
testing algorithms in use (e.g., sequential hypothesis testing
or 2-sided Chernoff bound). The full implementation can be
downloaded on the website of Plasma Lab4.
B. Running Verification
Running the verification tool consists of two steps as
follows. First, users define a set of observed variables and a
temporal resolution in a configuration file, as well as other
necessary information as an input for MAG to generate a
monitor and an aspect-advices file. AspectC++ is then used to
instrument automatically the model. The instrumented model
and the generated monitor are compiled and linked together
with the SystemC kernel into an executable model in order
to make a set of execution traces. Referring to the running
example, users will define the set of observed variables Vobs =
{c read, nelements, end sc}, where c read is the character
read in the FIFO, nelements is the number of characters in the
FIFO buffer, and end sc is true whenever the kernel phase is
at the end of the simulation-cycle notification phase. The tem-
poral resolution will be defined as Tr = {end sc}, meaning
that a new state in execution traces is produced whenever the
simulation kernel is at the end of simulation-cycle notification
phase or every one nanosecond in the example since the time
unit is one nanosecond. The full configuration file is included
in the source code of the example.
In the second step, the plugin is used to verify the properties
of interest. The satisfaction checking of the properties is
brought out based on the set of execution traces obtained by
executing the instrumented SystemC model and can be done
by several hypothesis testing algorithms provided by Plasma
Lab.
VI. CASE STUDIES
We report the experimental results for the running example
and also demonstrate the use of our verification tool to
analyze the dependability of a large embedded control system.
The number of components in this system makes numerical
approaches such as PMC infeasible. In both case studies, we
used the 2-sided Chernoff bound algorithm with the absolute
error δ = 0.02 and the confidence 1 − α = 0.98. The
experiments were run on a machine with an Intel Core i7
2.67 GHz processor and 4GB RAM under the Linux OS with
4https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/download/plugins/
SystemC 2.3.0, in which the checking of the properties in the
running example took from less than one minute to several
minutes. The analysis of the embedded and control system
case study takes almost 2 hours, in which 90 properties were
verified.
A. Producer and Consumer
Let us go back to the running example in Section III, recall
that we want to compute the probability that the following
property ϕ satisfies every 1 nanosecond, with the absolute
error 0.02 and the level of confidence 0.98. In this verifi-
cation, both the FIFO buffer size and message size are 10
characters including the starting and ending delimiters, and
the production and consumption rates are 1 nanosecond. First,
we check this property with the various values of p1 and
p2. The results are given in Table I with T = 5000 and
T1 = 25 nanoseconds. It is trivial that the probability that
the message latency is smaller than T1 time increases when
p1 and p2 increase. That means that, in general, the latency
is shorter when the either the probability that the producer
successfully writes to the FIFO increases, or the probability
that the consumer successfully reads from the FIFO increases.
Second, we compute the probability that a message is sent
p1\p2 0.3 0.6 0.9
0.6 0 0.0194 0.0720
0.9 0 0.0835 1
TABLE I: The probability that the message latency is smaller
than 25 in the first 5000 nanoseconds of operation
Fig. 2: The probability that the message latency is smaller than
T1 in the first T nanoseconds of operation
completely (or the message latency) from the producer to
the consumer within T1 time over a period of T time of
operation, in which the probabilities p1 and p2 are fixed at
0.9. Fig. 2 shows this probability with different values of T1
over T = 10000 nanoseconds. It is observed that the message
latency is almost smaller than 18 nanoseconds.
B. An Embedded Control System
This case study is closely based on the one presented in
[20], [14] but contains much more components. The system
consists of an input processor (I) connected to 50 groups of
3 sensors, an output processor (O), connected to 30 groups
of 2 actuators, and a main processor (M ), that communicates
with I and O through a bus. At every cycle, 1 minute, the
main processor polls data from the input processor that reads
and processes data from the sensor groups. Based on this data,
the main processor constructs commands to be passed to the
output processor for controlling the actuator groups.
The reliability of the system is affected by the failures of
the sensors, actuators, and processors. The probability of bus
failure is negligible, hence we do not consider it. The sensors
and actuators are used in 37 − of − 50 and 27 − of − 30
modular redundancies, respectively. That means if at least 37
sensor groups are functional (a sensor group is functional if
at least 2 of the 3 sensors are functional), the system has
enough information to function properly. Otherwise, the main
processor is reported to shut the system down. In the same
way, the system requires at least 27 functional actuator groups
to function properly (a actuator group is functional if at least 1
of the 2 actuators is functional). Transient and permanent faults
can occur in processors I or O and prevent the main processor
(M ) to read data from I or send commands to O. In that
case, M skips the current cycle. If the number of continuously
skipped cycles exceeds the limit K, the processor M shuts the
system down. When a transient fault occurs in a processor,
rebooting the processor repairs the fault. Lastly, if the main
processor fails, the system is automatically shut down. The
mean times to failure for the sensors, the actuators, and the
processors are 1 month, 2 months and 1 year, respectively.
The mean time to transient failure is 1 day and I/O processors
take 30 seconds, 1 time unit, to reboot.
The reliability of the system is modeled as a CTMC [18],
[25] that is realized in SystemC, in which a sensor group
has 4 states (0, 1, 2, 3, the number of working sensors), 3
states (0, 1, 2, the number of working actuators) for an ac-
tuator group, 2 states for the main processor (0: failure,
1: functional), and 3 states for I/O processors (0: failure,
1: transient failure, 2: functional). A state of the CTMC
is represented as a tuple of the component’s states, and
the mean times to failure define the delay before which a
transition between states is enabled. The delay is sampled
from a negative exponential distribution with parameter equal
to the corresponding mean time to failure. Hence, the model
has about 2155 states comparing to the model in [14] with
about 210 states, that makes the PMC technique is unfeasible.
That means the state explosion likely occurs, even with some
abstraction, i.e., symbolic model checking is applied. The full
implementation of the SystemC code and experiments of this
case study can be obtained at the website of our tool5. We
define four types of failures: failure1 is the failure of the
sensors, failure2 is the failure of the actuators, failure3 is
the failure of the I/O processors and failure4 is the failure
of the main processor. For example, failure1 is defined by
number sensors < 37) ∧ (proci status = 2). It specifies
that the number of working sensor groups has decreased
5https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/embedded-control-system/
below 37 and the input processor is functional, so that it can
report the failure to the main processor. We define failure2,
failure3, and failure4 in a similar way.
In our analysis which is based on the one in [14] with
K = 4, in which the properties are checked every 1 time
unit. First, we try to determine which kind of component
is more likely to cause the failure of the system, meaning
that we determine the probability that a failure related to a
given component occurs before any other failures. The atomic
proposition shutdown =
∨4
i=1 failurei indicates that the
system has shut down because one of the failures has occurred,
and the BLTL formula ¬shutdown U≤T failurei states that
the failure i occurs within T time units and no other failures
have occurred before the failure i occurs. Fig. 3 shows the
probability that each kind of failure occurs first over a period
of 30 days of operation. It is obvious that the sensors are
likelier to cause a system shutdown. At T = 20 days, it seems
that we reached a stationary distribution indicating for each
kind of component the probability that it is responsible for
the failure of the system.
Fig. 3: The probability that each of the 4 failure types is the
cause of system shutdown in the first T time of operation
For the second part of our analysis, we divide the states
of system into three classes: “up”, where every component
is functional, “danger”, where a failure has occurred but the
system has not yet shut down (e.g., the I/O processors have
just had a transient failure but they have rebooted in time),
and “shutdown”, where the system has shut down [14]. We
aim to compute the expected time spent in each class of states
by the system over a period of T time units. To this end, we
add in the model, for each class of state c, a random variable
reward c that measures the time spent in the class c. In our
tool, the formula X≤T reward c returns the mean value of
reward c after T time of execution. The results are plotted
in Fig. 4. From T = 20 days, it seems that the amounts of
time spent in the “up” and “danger” states are converged at
101.063 = 11.57 days and 10−1.967 = 0.01 days, respectively.
VII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
There has been a lot of work on the formalization of
SystemC [8], [17]. The goal is to extract a formal model from
a SystemC program, so that tools like model-checkers can be
applied. However, all these formalizations consider semantics
Fig. 4: The expected amount of time spent in each of the
states: “up”, “danger” and “shutdown”
of SystemC and its simulator in some form of global model,
and they also suffer from the state space explosion when
dealing with industrial and large systems.
In [29], Zuliani et al. extended the standard SMC algorithm
for verifying Stateflow/Simulink models of a fuel control
system featuring fault-tolerance and hybrid behavior, in which
properties under verification are expressed in BLTL. The ex-
tension is based on Bayesian interval estimation and Bayesian
sequential hypothesis testing. This technique is scalable for
larger Stateflow/Simulink models because verification is fast
in most cases and the Bayesian estimation is orders of mag-
nitudes faster than previous estimation-based model checking
algorithms.
Tabakov et al. [23] proposed a framework for monitoring
temporal SystemC properties. This framework allows users to
express the properties to verify by fully exposing the semantics
of the simulator as well as the user-code. They extend LTL by
providing some extra primitives for stating the atomic propo-
sitions and let users define a much finer temporal resolution.
Their implementation consists of a modified simulation kernel,
and a tool to automatically generate the monitors and aspect
advices for instrumenting SystemC programs automatically.
This paper presents the first attempt to verify non-trivial
temporal properties of a SystemC model with statistical model
checking techniques. The framework contains two main com-
ponents: a generator that automatically generates a monitor
and instruments the MUV based on the properties to be
verified, and a statistical model checker implementing a set of
hypothesis testing algorithms. In comparison to the probabilis-
tic model checking, our approach allows users to handle large
industrial systems, expose a rich set of user-code primitives in
form of atomic propositions in BLTL, and work directly with
SystemC models. For instance, our verification framework is
used to analyze the dependability of large industrial computer-
based control systems as shown in the case study.
Currently, we consider an external library as a “black box”,
meaning that we do not consider the states of external libraries.
Thus, arguments passed to a function in an external library
cannot be monitored. For future work, we would like to allow
users to monitor the states of the external libraries. We also
plan to apply statistical model checking to verify temporal
properties of SystemC-AMS (Analog/Mixed-Signal).
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